Author Archives: Scalper1

VPU: Utilities For Stronger Yields And Better Diversification

Summary VPU has a respectably low correlation to SPY, but the correlation and relative volatility have changed materially over time. The ETF is great for improving diversification benefits across the portfolio. The expense ratio and dividend yield are both great. If an investor is already using a large bond holding to diversify their portfolio, the benefits from adding VPU to the equity section won’t be as strong. A substantial portion of my analysis will use modern portfolio theory, so my goal is to find ways to minimize costs while achieving diversification at the portfolio level. In this article I’m reviewing the Vanguard Utilities ETF (NYSEARCA: VPU ). In my past analysis on other utility ETFs I have found they can offer some nice benefits to the portfolio from lower levels of volatility and lower levels of correlation to the S&P 500. However, finding a good utility ETF can be a problem because a high expense ratio can destroy a fund that would otherwise be very attractive. Since VPU has an expense ratio of only .12%, I’m feeling pretty optimistic going into this one. Does VPU provide diversification benefits to a portfolio? Each investor may hold a different portfolio, but I use the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) as the basis for my analysis. When I ran a regression on SPY and VPU, I found a correlation of 77%. That isn’t very low, but it is not high enough to be problematic. On the other hand, the annualized volatility of VPU since January 2004 was 17.6% compared to SPY having an annualized volatility of 19.4%. Since the sample size includes both very solid bull markets and harsh bear markets, it should be providing a reasonable indication of the relative level of volatility implicit in each investment. However, if an investor focuses only on the last couple of years the resulting volatility levels are significantly less favorable for VPU. Over the last 26 months the annualized volatility on VPU was 14% and it was only 11.3% on SPY. On the other hand, during those 26 months the correlation was only around 52% rather than the longer term average of 77%. Yield & Taxes The yield is 3.35%. That may not sound incredibly high, but it isn’t bad either. Higher yields on the ETFs are nice because they reduce the incentive for human error. Many investors materially underperform the S&P 500 because of a human tendency to buy high and sell low. Having an ETF with a high dividend yield encourages investors to avoid selling off their shares when prices fall. The benefit here could be considered a placebo effect, but so long as it encourages investors to hold onto their equity through the downturn the result is more wealth in the long run. Expense Ratio The ETF is posting .12% for an expense ratio. What else is there to say? That is a solid expense ratio. Largest Holdings The diversification within the ETF is pretty weak. For a very long term holder it might make sense to replicate the ETF by just buying the underlying securities and taking higher trading costs to eliminate the expense ratio. However, an expense ratio of only .12% would be difficult to beat without a fairly long time horizon or a large volume of commission free trades in the account. (click to enlarge) The major holdings here are the same ones I would expect to see. Duke Energy Corporation (NYSE: DUK ) is a fairly huge utility company and frequently at the top of the list for utility ETFs. All around this appears to be a reasonable portfolio for an investor that wants to get more utility companies into their portfolio without having to buy the companies individually. Conclusion Utility companies can act as a form of income investment because of their strong dividend yields. Unlike buying into a bond portfolio investors can expect that the level of dividends will be increasing over time which makes up for the portfolio having more risk than a simple bond portfolio. When it comes down to designing an ideal portfolio, I think there is a viable argument for running a higher allocation to the utility sector as a way to improve diversification throughout the portfolio. The biggest weakness for using utility companies as a way to diversify the portfolio is that the diversification benefits of the utility allocation are not as strong as the benefits from simply using a diversified bond portfolio since bonds have historically shown materially lower correlations with the S&P 500. If an investor already has a large allocation to bonds, the benefits of adding VPU will not be as strong. On the other hand, if an investor places a high value on getting qualified dividends as a source of income, it would materially increase the relative attractiveness of VPU. In those cases, it would make sense to use a stronger allocation to VPU to reduce portfolio risk. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Information in this article represents the opinion of the analyst. All statements are represented as opinions, rather than facts, and should not be construed as advice to buy or sell a security. Ratings of “outperform” and “underperform” reflect the analyst’s estimation of a divergence between the market value for a security and the price that would be appropriate given the potential for risks and returns relative to other securities. The analyst does not know your particular objectives for returns or constraints upon investing. All investors are encouraged to do their own research before making any investment decision. Information is regularly obtained from Yahoo Finance, Google Finance, and SEC Database. If Yahoo, Google, or the SEC database contained faulty or old information it could be incorporated into my analysis.

Shock And Horror: Passive Hedge Funds

An academic article entitled “Passive Hedge Funds” has recently attracted quite a lot of comment in the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and on a variety of websites. Those whose ambition in life seems to be to discredit hedge funds and their managers at every turn have, of course, latched onto it. But the paper’s title is tendentious, its argument familiar and in some places flawed, and its conclusions really quite anodyne. Investors seeking hedge fund-like exposure through liquid alternatives will find that some products are similar to those described in that article; they should examine them very carefully before investing. The purported humor of math jokes often depends on the technical use of a term that has other, more familiar meanings. Thus, my college roommate’s knee-slapper about how every integer is interesting relied on a definition of ‘interesting’ as ‘having a unique property.’ The joke took the form of a mathematical induction: 1 is the multiplicative identity, 2 is the only even prime, 3 is the lowest true prime, 4 is the lowest perfect square… so if there is an uninteresting integer, it is interesting, because it is the lowest one. Maybe you had to be there. I am reminded of this moment of boundless mirth by a paper entitled ” Passive Hedge Funds ,” by Mikhail Tupitsyn and Paul Lajbcygier. This title has, inevitably, attracted comment, including headlines such as “Study: Hedge Funds Don’t Do S**t, Suck” (gawker.com) or, with less sophistication and élan, “New Study Argues Hedge Funds are an Even Worse Scam than We Thought” (vox.com) and even more prosaically, “The Case Against Hedge Fund Managers” (ai-cio.com). With the apparent exception of the latter, these commentators were so enamored by their deeply considered wisdom that they clearly felt no need to read the paper. Because its authors are quite explicit about their idiosyncratic use of the term ‘passive.’ They even put scare-quotes around it. The commentators just missed the punchline. It is hard to dispute Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean ─ neither more nor less.” Since they take pains to explain what they mean by it, I have no argument with the authors’ use of ‘passive.’ They might have used ‘hippopotamus,’ which is more euphonious, but lacking poetic souls, they chose ‘passive,’ and missed the opportunity for a great title. The sense in which the authors use ‘passive’ to describe hedge fund return patterns is that they have linear correlation to hedge fund β. The crux of their argument is that “A manager with genuine investment skill should not only have “passive” linear risk exposures to alternative risk factors ( i.e ., alternative beta) but should also produce enhanced returns through nonlinear ‘active risk exposures.'” This is contentious, as will be seen below, but it is simply posited as a truth rather than justified. Was their choice of ‘passive’ tendentious and self-promoting? Of course: how else would a postdoc and an associate prof at Melbourne’s #2 university get noticed in the Financial Times or Bloomberg, let alone a temple to the Muses such as gawker.com? Was it helpful? Our commentators’ complete failure to understand the authors’ intent makes it rather obvious that it was not. The Tupitsyn and Lajbcygier article is, as their review of the literature makes clear, one of a long line of academic studies that propose models for hedge fund returns. Even critics more competent than our commentators tend to latch onto these studies as “proof” that hedge funds offer little value-added. But anything can be modeled ─ conventional mutual funds, sunspot frequencies, even (allegedly) the earth’s climate. Problems arise when, as Emanuel Derman and others have noted, the models are mistaken for reality. And hedge fund β ─ against which the authors argue hedge fund managers fail to add value ─ is, at best, a very peculiar concept, and arguably a spurious one. On consideration, the authors’ argument begins to look strangely circular: hedge funds fail to add value relative to metrics that derive from their own returns. This is something like arguing that I am a lousy swimmer because I am unable to swim faster than myself. I may well be a lousy swimmer, but comparison with my own performance will not establish that. A good portion of Tupitsyn’s and Lajbcygier’s analysis is devoted to returns on hedge fund indices. In choosing these as a database, they, like many before them, commit the fallacy of composition. The fact that you can calculate a mean return from a pile of reports does not indicate that there is such a thing as an average hedge fund: it is not only possible, but likely that none of the funds analyzed exhibited the mean return. Further, there is no reason to expect continuity from one time period to another: a fund whose return was close to the center of the distribution in one period may be an outlier in the next. Hedge fund returns are widely dispersed both synchronically and over time, so that the value of hedge fund indices is pretty much restricted to service as performance metrics for specific time periods. The standard error of the mean = s/√n, where ‘s’ is the σ of the population and ‘n’ is its size. Obviously, the error is significantly higher and thus the epistemic value of the mean significantly less, the more dispersed the population is. Given the wide dispersion of hedge fund returns, the value of their average is largely restricted to the bragging rights it gives to marketers fortunate enough to work for funds that have outperformed it. The authors are aware of these limitations, and devote some analysis to the returns of individual, real world funds. They find that most funds have strong linear exposures to familiar factor influences on investment returns. They conclude that “The nonlinear risk is more pronounced in arbitrage styles and styles following multiple strategies, and it is weaker in directional styles.” This should hardly be surprising ─ arbitrage is inherently non-linear ─ and it is not at all clear why the presence of linear risk in other sorts of strategies should somehow suggest dereliction of duty on the part of their managers. If, for example, a dedicated short fund carried no (negative) equity exposure, its investors would certainly have reason to object! Admittedly, fewer long/short funds make use of their ability to add value by adjusting their net exposure than might be expected, and with relatively stable long/short ratios, their exposure to equity risk factors would, of course, be linear. The same would be true of any long-only equity fund, and would certainly not attract criticism. In fact, long/short funds have increasingly tended to pursue a trading-oriented (“risk on/risk off”) response to changes in their risk perceptions in place of making changes to their short positions. As a group, hedge funds provide us with ample reasons to criticize them. Despite declining over the last few years, fees are in most cases still too high for the service provided. Lack of transparency inhibits rational analysis and portfolio construction, while providing a breeding ground for a wide range of abuses and sharp practice. The artificial mystique that this opacity fosters is repulsively reminiscent of Ozma of Oz. However, neither an adolescent potty-mouth nor accusations of fraud are not needed to make these points forcefully and to draw the appropriate conclusions for investors. Nor are “discoveries” that hedge fund α is not a matter of otherworldly powers to bend the laws of economics to the manager’s will ─ that their skills might be very similar in both nature and quantity to the skills that conventional portfolio managers exhibit. Tupitsyn and Lajbcygier have made a small contribution to the growing literature on hedge fund replication ─ nothing less, but certainly nothing more. Theirs is only one approach to hedge fund replication, and to my mind a less than satisfactory one. Factor replication is an inherently backward-looking approach to modeling, and when applied to the return streams from hedge funds, likely to result in some rather peculiar portfolios. A technique that I suspect has much more promise is the creation of robo-managers ─ algorithmic trading techniques that mimic the trading strategies hedge funds are known to pursue. Many hedge funds, particularly CTAs, are already effectively automated. While it is illegal to steal their code, it is possible to imitate it based on an analysis of their returns. In considering an investment in liquid alternative funds, many of which are “quantitatively-driven” in ways that are rarely specified explicitly and require research to understand, the nature of the security selection technique should be given careful consideration. Approaches similar to that of Tupitsyn and Lajbcygier are worth a look, but may not deliver all that they promise; the source of the factor exposures they purport to imitate must be investigated. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Market Lab Report – Premarket Pulse 8/25/15

US markets opened down several percent yesterday in a capitulation-type move to the downside, then partially clawed their way back. The NASDAQ Composite closed lower, finishing roughly midbar with the highest volume since August 2011 while the S&P 500 closed in the lower half of its trading range, also on huge volume. Fears of a global slowdown as well as higher interest rates are weighing on the markets. Expect a continuation of elevated volatility as the market struggles to find its footing in this news driven market. That said, China lowered interest rates and reserve requirements overnight as it struggles to rescue its crashing markets. The Shanghai Index still closed down -7.6%. The move by the People’s Bank of China, however, sent U.S. futures higher on both the NASDAQ and S&P 500 by almost 4% at the time of this writing. Dow futures are up over 600 points. There is also talk that the Fed may have no choice but to start a new round of quantitative easing, a la QE4 should the global economy sink into recession. Of course, there is ample evidence that quantitative easing which began in late 2008 does little to jump start economies. QE is a band-aid over a deeply infected wound. AS we discussed yesterday before the open, using the gap-down capitulation move at the open to cover short positions, namely in TSLA which reached a low of 195, nearly 30% below where we recommended the stock as a short in the 260 area early last week. The stock is now rallying up to its 200-day moving average, which brings it back into shortable range using the line as a guide for an upside stop.