Author Archives: Scalper1

Amazon, Netflix Stream Past Earnings Estimates

Streaming video is one of the fastest growing industries as “cord-cutting” consumers continue switching from TV networks to Web-based content. Amazon (AMZN) and Netflix (NFLX) were early market leaders and are widely expected to continue growing in the streaming market. Today’s Screen Of The Day is Estimate Beaters, stocks that beat earnings-per-share estimates by the widest margin in the latest reported quarter. Amazon absolutely crushed EPS

The Real Danger Of Leveraged ETFs And ETNs

Summary A Seeking Alpha author highlights an unfortunate experience he had with a leveraged ETN. This article takes a closer look at the math – was the leveraged ETN to blame? The real dangers of using leverage ETFs and ETNs are presented. In a recent article entitled ” How I Got Burned By Leveraged ETNs “, Seeking Alpha author David Butler relates an unfortunate experience that he had with a 3x leveraged ETN, the VelocityShares 3x Long Crude Oil ETN (NYSEARCA: UWTI ). He writes about his investment: I bought in again at $3.64 believing the sky was the limit. Was it a dumb buy? Absolutely not. The mistake was not paying attention. Due to the big unrecoverable hits you can take on leveraged ETNs, you have to watch them closely and cut your losses quick if you start to lose. I was over confident. My past success had me thinking I couldn’t lose with this wonder security. Two weeks later, oil was in the beginning of its next downtrend…and I was kicking myself for losing a big portion of my previous gains. Did I take my medicine, cut my losses and sell? You all know the answer to that one. I waited. I thought “maybe oil will jump back up and I’ll get it all back”. Did it happen? You know the answer to that one too. UWTI’s chart says it all…. The author also presented an oft-quoted scenario, where the price of a security alternately increases and decreases by 10%, causing the corresponding 2X ETN to rapidly decay (original source ). In closing, David writes: Today, UWTI is trading at just around $1. Decay, combined with oil’s downward spiral killed me. Leveraged ETFs/ETNs Over the years, a number of Seeking Alpha authors have espoused on the pros and cons of leveraged ETFs or ETNs. At one extreme, Canary Cash gives reasons ” Why You Must Never Ever (Ever) Invest In A Leveraged ETN For Much Longer Than A Day “, one of which is the decay that occurs when the index increases and decreases successively. On the other hand, Dane Van Domelen has argued in an article entitled ” What The Numbers Say About Long-Term Investments In Leveraged ETFs ” that daily swings of plus- or minus-10% are exceptionally rare, and in most cases, the decay issue is much less serious than initially claimed. My personal portfolio also includes a number of income-generating, 2x leveraged funds, including the UBS ETRACS ETNs which I have written about extensively (see this article for a summary of the ETRACS line-up of 2x ETNs). By resetting monthly, these ETNs appear to partially mitigate the decay issue associated with daily-resetting funds. I have also studied the practical issues associated with harvesting this decay by shorting leveraged ETF/ETN pairs. Therefore, I was interested in further studying the reasons why David Butler’s investment in UWTI performed so poorly. Was it due to the inherent decay of leveraged ETFs/ETNs, or was it something else? At this juncture, I wish to emphasize that while much of this analysis focuses on David’s investment decision in UWTI and its associated consequences, this event could have happened to anyone, including myself. Furthermore, I do not intend to (nor am I qualified to) make a judgement on whether David’s investment at the time was “good” or “bad” – hindsight is always 20/20! The following is therefore intended to be a general analysis of the issues associated with an individual investing in any leveraged ETF/ETN. Comparing the 1x and 3x funds In his article, David writes that he bought UWTI at $3.64, but sold at around $1.00. As David did not provide the exact dates of his buying and selling, let’s assume that he bought on the last day that UWTI closed above $3.64, i.e. Jun 10th, and sold on the first day that UWTI closed below $1.00, i.e. Aug 19th. The following chart shows the price change for UWTI between those dates, together with the corresponding 1x fund, the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return ETN (NYSEARCA: OIL ). As expected, the 3x fund has done much worse than the 1x fund, but not three times as poorly – that would be impossible as it would take the price of the UWTI into negative territory. UWTI and OIL returned -74.6% and -39.0%, respectively, during this period. It is known that leveraged ETFs/ETNs suffer from beta decay or slippage when the underlying asset is volatile with no net change over a period of time. However, note that both UWTI and OIL declined nearly monotonically during the test period, with no notable rallies. Therefore, I would have to conclude that the beta decay or slippage of ETFs played only a small, if any, part in UWTI’s decline. The same exposure without leverage Let’s consider a hypothetical investor “Joe” who invests $10,000 into UWTI over the time period indicated above. Let’s also consider Joe’s twin brother, “Jack”, who has read about the dangers of using leveraged ETFs/ETNs and the decay associated with such funds. However, he still wants to have the same exposure to oil as Joe, so he instead decides to invest $30,000 into the corresponding 1x fund OIL. How have Joe and Jack fared over the time period indicated above? Since UWTI declined by -74.6%, Joe’s $10,000 investment has dwindled into $2,540, which represents a loss of $7,460. On the other hand, Jack’s $30,000 investment in oil declined by “only” -39.0% to $18,300, but because of his larger initial base, his nominal loss comes out to be $11,700, which is more than 50% that of Joe’s. In other words, investing $10,000 into a 3x fund rather than $30,000 into a 1x fund actually benefited Joe during oil’s decline, even though both brothers had the same apparent exposure to oil. The reason for this is quite simple. At the risk of stating the obvious, the maximum loss of a $10,000 investment is $10,000, while the maximum loss of a $30,000 investment is $30,000. Once OIL declined by more than 33% (turning Jack’s $30,000 into $20,000), there was no way that Joe could lose more money than Jack. In fact, if Jack had purchased OIL on 50% margin, a -39.0% fall in the fund will bring his percentage of equity to 18.0%, below the minimum maintenance requirement of most brokers, thus possibly triggering a margin call and leading to forced selling. The real danger of leveraged ETFs and ETNs The results of this exercise suggest that the real danger of leveraged ETFs and ETNs is not their inherent leverage, nor their associated decay. In my opinion, the first real danger of leveraged ETFs/ETNs is that investors “forget” that their investment is leveraged and neglect to position-size accordingly. This observation leads to the following advice: Only invest $10,000 in a 3x fund if you are entirely comfortable with investing $30,000 in the corresponding 1x fund . The second real danger of leveraged ETFs/ETNs is that any changes in price become amplified, leading to either of two pitfalls, the first of which is overconfidence. David Butler writes: I first bought the VelocityShares 3x Long Crude Oil ETN [UWTI] back in March for $2.24. Less than a month later I sold at $2.53. As the Exchange traded notes kept climbing I bought back in again at $2.82 and sold at $3.20. Suddenly, I was hooked on the volatility of oil ETFs and ETNs. David pocketed a cool 13% in less than a month on his first UWTI investment, while the underlying index might only have appreciated by around 4%. His second investment also returned 13%, although the time frame was not stated. A double-digit monthly return would undoubtedly be the envy of all of Wall Street, and it is understandable as to why an investor would become overconfident in such a situation. The second pitfall associated with amplified price changes is that when prices go south, the large proportional decrease in the leveraged fund might trigger panic in an investor, leading to selling at inopportune times. Notwithstanding the fact that such a panic sale might, in hindsight, have been the correct decision, it is a generally-accepted maxim that emotional behavior is best left out of stock-market decisions. Summary While a 74.6% loss in any investment is no fun, David Butler could possibly be comforted by the fact that had he invested three times of his UWTI investment amount into the corresponding 1x fund OIL, he would have lost over 50% as much money, despite having the same apparent exposure to oil. It is my opinion that the true dangers of leveraged ETFs/ETNs are not due to any structural issues associated with leverage or decay. Rather, I believe that the two main dangers of using leveraged products are both psychological . The first is the issue of position-sizing, and I believe that my advice from above bears repeating: Only invest $10,000 in a 3x fund if you are entirely comfortable with investing $30,000 in the corresponding 1x fund . only invest $10,000 in a 2x fund if you are entirely comfortable with investing $20,000 in the corresponding 1x fund . The second danger is that the amplified price movements of leveraged ETFs/ETNs can trigger either overconfidence (when prices go up) or panic (when prices go down) in the everyday investor. Finally, I should make the very obvious point that it is the choice of the underlying security that primarily determines a fund’s performance, and not whether it is 1x or 3x leveraged. Had Joe instead invested $10,000 into the VelocityShares 3x Inverse Crude ETN (NYSEARCA: DWTI ), the 3x leveraged short version of OIL, his investment would have ballooned to $31,670. DWTI data by YCharts I hope that this analysis was helpful for investors considering investing in leveraged ETFs or ETNs. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Finding Bargains Among High Income CEFs Selling At Historic Discounts

Summary The discounts associated with CEFs are at historic highs, with many discounts over 2 standard deviations from the mean. The highly discounted CEFs have been significantly more volatile than high yield bonds. MGU and GLO had the best risk-adjusted performance among the CEFs analyzed. As an income focused investor, I was a fan of high distribution Closed End Funds (CEFs). Many of these funds have been hit hard by the Fed’s plans to increase interest rates. As the prices deteriorated, the discounts of these CEFs have widened to historically large levels. This is evidenced by their Z-score, a statistic popularized by Morningstar to measure how far a discount (or premium) is from the mean discount (or premium). The Z-score is computed in terms of standard deviations from the mean so it can be used to rank CEFs. A good source for Z-scores is the CEFAnalysis website . (Thanks to SA author, Left Bank, for his article on where to find Z-scores). A Z-score more negative than minus 2 is relatively rare, occurring less than 2.25% of the time. However, in today’s environment, there are over 150 CEFs that have one year Z-scores more negative than minus 2, which illustrates the current lack of demand for these CEFs. There were too many CEFs to analyze so I reduced the sample size by using the following selection criteria: A Z-score more negative than minus 2.9. This will occur (assuming a normal distribution) less than 0.2% of the time. A history that includes October 12, 2007 (the beginning of the 2008 bear market) A daily average volume greater than 100,000 shares A market cap of at least $100 million. A distribution of 6% or higher The following CEFs satisfy all these criteria. Clough Global Opportunities Fund (NYSEMKT: GLO ). The CEF sells at a discount of 16.7% and has a Z-score of negative 3.59. This CEF has a “go anywhere” philosophy and has a portfolio of 167 securities, with 60% allocated to the equities, 28% to cash alternatives, and 7% to bonds. The fund may also use an option strategy to increase income. The fund uses a high leverage of 52% and has an expense ratio of 2.2%. The distribution is 10.7%, consisting primarily of gains and Return of Capital (ROC). Over the past year, ROC has been used 50% of the time, with the amount of ROC ranging from 30% to 100%. Invesco Credit Opportunities Fund (NYSE: VTA ). This CEF sells at a discount of 15.3% and has a Z-score of negative 3.59. It has a portfolio of 610 securities invested primarily in senior loans (76%) and high yield bonds (18%). The fund uses 33% leverage and has an expense ratio of 2.5%. The distribution is 8.2% with no ROC. Madison Covered Call and Equity Strategy Fund (NYSE: MCN ). This CEF sells at a discount of 15.1% and has a Z-score of negative 3.3. The portfolio consists of 47 securities, with 78% in equities and 20% in short-term debt. The fund does not use leverage and has an expense ratio of 0.8%. The distribution is 9.7% with no ROC. LMP Corporate Loan Fund (NYSE: TLI ). This CEF sells for a discount of 13% and has a Z-score of negative 3.25. The portfolio consists of 268 securities invested primarily in senior loans (87%) and high yield bonds (8%). The fund uses 33% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.8%. The distribution is 8.4% with no ROC. Macquarie Global Infrastructure Total Return Fund (NYSE: MGU ). This CEF sells for a discount of 16.9% and has a Z-score of negative 3.09. The fund is concentrated with 51 holdings in infrastructure companies (89%) and 6% in master limited partnerships. The fund uses 30% leverage and has an expense ratio of 2.2%. The distribution is 7%, paid from income and capital gains with no ROC. Calamos Convertible Opportunities and Income Fund (NASDAQ: CHI ). This CEF sells at a discount of 11.2% and has a Z-score of negative 3.04. The portfolio consists of 287 securities, with 57% in convertible bonds and 38% in high yield bonds. The fund uses 28% leverage and has an expense ratio of 1.5%. The distribution is 10.8% with 2 months of ROC during the past year. MS Emerging Markets Debt Fund (NYSE: MSD ). This CEF sells for a discount of 18.3% and has a Z-score of negative 2.95. The portfolio consists of 115 emerging market holdings, with 41% investment grade bonds and the rest in high yield bonds. The fund uses only 8% leverage and has an expense ratio of 3.5%. The distribution is 6.6% with no ROC. GDL Fund (NYSE: GDL ). This CEF sells for a discount of 18.1% and has a Z-score of negative 2.9. The fund seeks total return by using arbitrage transactions and investing in reorganizations and spinoffs. It has 159 holdings, with 75% in equity and 21% in Government bonds. It uses 35% leverage and has an expense ratio of 3%. The distribution is 6.5% with only a small amount of ROC over the past year (the distribution for one quarter had 25% ROC). Based on the Z-score, these high income CEFs appear to be bargains, but Z-score is only one metric to consider. I also like to look at the reward-versus-risk over different time frames. In my mind, the best fund is the one that delivers the highest reward for a given level of risk. This article will analyze these CEFs in terms of risk-versus-reward to help you determine which may be right for your portfolio. To assess the performance of the selected CEFs, I plotted the annualized rate of return in excess of the risk free rate (called Excess Mu in the charts) versus the volatility of each of the component funds over the past bear-bull cycle (from October 12, 2007 to August 28, 2015). The risk free rate was set at 0% so that performance could be easily assessed. This plot is shown in Figure 1. Note that the rate of return is based on price, not Net Asset Value (NAV). I used the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: HYG ) as a reference. (click to enlarge) Figure 1. Risk versus Reward over the bear-bull cycle The plot illustrates that these CEFs have booked a wide range of returns. To better assess the relative performance of these funds, I calculated the Sharpe Ratio. The Sharpe Ratio is a metric, developed by Nobel laureate William Sharpe that measures risk-adjusted performance. It is calculated as the ratio of the excess return over the volatility. This reward-to-risk ratio (assuming that risk is measured by volatility) is a good way to compare peers to assess if higher returns are due to superior investment performance or from taking additional risk. In Figure 1, I plotted a red line that represents the Sharpe Ratio associated with HYG. If an asset is above the line, it has a higher Sharpe Ratio than HYG. Conversely, if an asset is below the line, the reward-to-risk is worse than HYG. Some interesting observations are evident from the figure. High Z-score CEFs are substantially more volatile than HYG. This is not surprising since CEFs can sell at discounts and many use leverage. With the exception of VTA, the CEFs had larger absolute returns than HYG. However, when volatility is factored into the calculation, only 4 CEFs (GDL, GLO, MGU, and MSD) beat HYG on a risk-adjusted basis. Two other CEFs (TLI and MCU) had risk-adjusted performances similar to HYG. Among the CEFs, MSD was the best performer followed by GLO, MGU, and GDL. The worst performer on a risk-adjusted and absolute basis was VTA. These funds utilized different investment strategies, so I wanted to assess how much diversification you might receive by buying multiple funds. To be “diversified,” you want to choose assets such that when some assets are down, others are up. In mathematical terms, you want to select assets that are uncorrelated (or at least not highly correlated) with each other. I calculated the pair-wise correlations associated with the funds. For reference, I also included the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) as a proxy for the overall stock market. The results are presented in Figure 2. (click to enlarge) Figure 2. Correlation over the bear-bull cycle The figure presents what is called a correlation matrix. The symbols for the funds are listed in the first column on the left side of the figure. The symbols are also listed along the first row at the top. The number in the intersection of the row and column is the correlation between the two assets. For example, if you follow VTA to the right for three columns, you will see that the intersection with GLO is 0.650. This indicates that, over the past bear-bull cycle, the price of VTA and GLO were 65% correlated. Note that all assets are 100% correlated with themselves so the values along the diagonal of the matrix are all ones. As shown in the figure, the CEFs were not very correlated with HYG or among themselves. The highest correlation was between SPY and GLO, which was expected since GLO contained a large position in equities. The overall conclusion is that you can obtain diversification by purchasing more than one of these funds. Next, I wanted to see how these funds fared during more recent times so I used a 5-year look-back period. The results are shown in Figure 3 and what a difference a few years made. The CEFs are still more volatile than HYG, but HYG now beats all the CEFs in terms of risk-adjusted performance. MSD fell from being the best performer to the worst, and VTA moved up from being at the bottom to the third best. MGU had by far the best risk-adjusted performance among the CEFs, with GLO coming in second. GDL was again the least volatile but also did not have a high return. (click to enlarge) Figure 3. Risk versus reward over past 5 years My final analysis used a 3-year look-back period, and the results are shown in Figure 4. During this period, GLO, MGU, and MCN were the top performers on a risk-adjusted basis. These CEFs outperformed HYG on both an absolute and risk-adjusted basis. MSD continued its poor performance, booking a negative return. (click to enlarge) Figure 4. Risk versus reward over the past 3 years Bottom Line These large Z-score CEFs had a wide range of performance relative to each other and to HYG. All of these CEFs are much more volatile than high yield bonds so they would only be suitable for risk tolerant investors. These CEFs are at historically wide discounts and may be bargains in terms of discounts but their overall performance left something to be desired. If you want to take a gamble on these funds, I would recommend MGU. GLO could also be considered, but I am a little cautious of this fund’s ROC. No one can predict the future, but based on the past, these two CEFs have consistently outperformed their peers on a risk-adjusted basis. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, but may initiate a long position in MGU over the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.