Author Archives: Scalper1

Where Are The Best Opportunities In Preferred Shares?

Preferred shares belong in every income portfolio. My preference is to use closed-end funds for a preferred shares allocation. In this article I survey all closed-end funds that cover this category with emphasis on identifying leading candidates. Every income portfolio needs an allocation to preferred shares. It will come as no surprise to regular readers when I say I prefer to get mine from CEFs (closed-end funds). It’s my view that there are two areas where CEFs excel relative to competing instruments. One is in the tax-free, municipal bond category and the other is preferred shares. In this article I look at the range of offerings in preferred shares CEFs. There are 16 preferred shares funds listed on cefconnect . Funds Market Cap ($M) Cohen & Steers Ltd Duration Preferred & Income Fund, Inc. (NYSE: LDP ) $663.35 Cohen & Steers Select Preferred & Income Fund, Inc. (NYSE: PSF ) $280.60 Flaherty & Crumrine Dynamic Preferred & Income Fund Inc (NYSE: DFP ) $428.16 Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Securities Income Fund Inc (NYSE: FFC ) $806.35 Flaherty & Crumrine Total Return Fund Inc (NYSE: FLC ) $185.10 Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund Inc (NYSE: PFD ) $139.80 Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Opportunity Fund Inc (NYSE: PFO ) $127.24 First Trust Intermediate Duration Preferred & Income Fund (NYSE: FPF ) $1,315.02 John Hancock Preferred Income Fund Ii (NYSE: HPF ) $405.14 John Hancock Preferred Income Fund (NYSE: HPI ) $502.51 John Hancock Preferred Income Fund Iii (NYSE: HPS ) $529.13 John Hancock Premium Dividend Fund (NYSE: PDT ) $630.31 Nuveen Quality Preferred Income Fund 3 (NYSE: JHP ) $195.68 Nuveen Preferred Income Opportunities Fund (NYSE: JPC ) $878.56 Nuveen Quality Preferred Income Fund 2 (NYSE: JPS ) $1,089.51 Nuveen Quality Preferred Income Fund (NYSE: JTP ) $525.58 CEFs offer powerful advantages in the preferred shares space. First there is leverage. Ok, I know I just wrote an article questioning the value of leverage ( Is Leverage Really an Advantage in Equity Closed End-Funds? ) but the key word in that title is “equity.” Of course preferred shares do fall under the rubric of equity investments, but in my mind they skirt the line between fixed-income and equity, pushing more toward the fixed-income side. So, here I do consider leverage an advantage. And in any case, there is no choice; all 16 preferred shares CEFs are leveraged within a fairly tight range. Effective leverage varies from 28.65% to 33.92%. The median is 33.59%, so the distribution is clearly top heavy as this distribution chart shows. A second advantage is skilled management. This comes at a cost; these funds average 1.7% fees, about a quarter of which is interest cost for leverage. In this category, as in many of the fixed-income categories, managers have tools available that most individuals do not. Leverage is one of them. Another is the ability to use hedging strategies in response to significant increases in long-term interest rates. And a third is access to credit information along with the quantitative tools to use that information to an investor’s best advantage. And a final factor is the opportunity to purchase CEFs at a discount, something not generally possible in other investment vehicles. Every one of these 16 CEFs is priced at a discount. These advantages combine to generate income appreciably greater than a comparable portfolio of preferred shares an individual can assemble, or that one obtains from ETFs. To support that generalization, I preset these data comparing the median CEF to iShares U.S. Preferred Stock ETF (NYSEARCA: PFF ) and Preferred Portfolio ( PGX ), the two largest ETFs in the category. Fund Yield PFF 6.13% PGX 6.01% CEF minimum 7.69% CEF median 8.64% CEF maximum 9.01% The median yielding CEF is outpacing PFF by 41% and PGX by 44%. The difference cannot be accounted for by the 33% leverage alone. Management priorities, driven by investor priorities, are a part of the mix; this may show up in CEFs having higher levels of credit risk, for example, as management caters a fund to appeal to investors willing to accept that risk for the higher yields it can bring. Another important factor is premium/discount status. Large premiums and discounts are part of the nature of CEFs, but not a factor in ETFs or open-end mutual funds. The importance of discount shows up in enhanced yields. The median fund’s yield on NAV is 7.82%, well below the median yield at market seen in the table (8.64%). It is the median discount of -9.03% that gets the additional 82 basis point of yield into the investor’s pocket. Of course, the median yielding and the median discounted fund are not necessarily the same fund, I’m just making a point here and using median values to illustrate it. One can readily do the math for individual funds. So what are the yields of our 16 preferred shares CEFs? Here we have yield at market, and yield on NAV. How do funds find their market price levels relative to their NAVs? Obviously there are multiple complex factors, but among the most important is the tendency for the market to drive yields to an equilibrium level via discounts or premiums. This can be seen graphically in the next chart where discount is plotted against distribution on NAV. This trend is seen in every category of CEFs I’ve looked at. There are exceptions, of course, but in general lower NAV yields produce deeper discounts. FFC with the highest NAV yield is the least discounted fund. In fact, discount territory is a relatively unaccustomed place for FFC to find itself in. When I last wrote about preferreds a year ago ( This Fund May Be Your Best Call for Preferred Shares ), I opined that FFC at a discount was a smart buy. That discount was nearly the same as today’s. I continue to feel that way and certainly consider it attractive at its present level. If we accept the tendency to move toward NAV Distribution/Discount equilibrium, the best values should be found among the funds below the trend line. Eliot Mintz had discussed this in relation to tax-free muni-bond CEFs ( Municpal Bond Closed End Funds – How to Find the Best Values ). By this criterion, FPF, JPC, the John Hancock Funds (HPS, HPI and HPF) and PSF merit a close look. A second aspect of CEFs that has a tendency to revert to mean values is Premium/Discount status. This tendency is well documented in the academic research on the subject and can provide a source of alpha. This is measured by Z-Scores. More negative Z-Scores indicates current prices are more discounted than the mean premium/discount. Sometimes one can find buying opportunities among funds that have deeply negative Z-scores. They are also useful in providing an overall picture of trends in a category over time. Here’s how the 16 funds fare for this metric. PDT and PSF are much more discounted today than their 3-, 6- or 12-month means by large margins. FPF, which looked interesting from the Distribution/Discount analysis, has been reducing its discount steadily and now stands about one standard deviation form its three-month mean. The John Hancock funds (HPF, HPI, HPS) show appealing Z-Scores indicating again that they could merit our attention. This report is intended as a broad survey of the preferred shares CEF category. I will be following up with a closer look at the funds that look most attractive in the next installment. We’ll look at management strategies, portfolio quality, sustainability of distributions and other factors that go into choosing a fund. Among my “best bets” that I’ll be covering are FFC, which I consider the best of the field but possibly not a buy at this time; FPF; and the John Hancock funds. Meanwhile I and other readers would certainly appreciate hearing from readers regarding their opinions on the subject of preferred shares funds.

Don’t Invest With Your Convictions. They’re Wrong.

Summary Investors overestimate their knowledge of financial markets. Realized returns of individual investors substantially lag benchmark results. There is no clear evidence of persistence in mutual fund returns. Most investors have some kind of view on today’s stock and bond markets. It’s only natural. Financial media is everywhere. Investment news and opinions are delivered to our smartphones as soon as they are written. While the bandwidth of financial information has expanded dramatically, its noise to signal ratio remains stubbornly high. Buy Gold! Metals are dead! The Stock Market is too high! The Market has room to run up! The reality is that almost no one knows. And it’s virtually impossible for John Q Public to identify those few who do know. This newsletter talks about investor convictions and their impact on financial outcomes. The Big Picture One way to evaluate the success of individual investor sentiment is to take a look at aggregated performance. How is everybody doing? As a group … very poorly. DALBAR is an independent consultancy that reports annually on the success that individual investors enjoy relative to various financial benchmarks. In effect, they measure the ability of the public to time movements into and out of mutual funds over long periods of time. There is a lag between expectations and performance. For the 30 years ending 2014, average equity and bond fund investors massively underperformed their respective benchmarks – the S&P 500 and Aggregate Bond Index. Why is the Investor so Wrong? There are two basic explanations for the lag. Investors repeatedly demonstrate tendencies injurious to financial health. Collectively, they lurch from euphoria to panic – based on recent market performance. In fact, investor performance lags are largest during periods of heightened market volatility. These general conclusions deserve some anecdotes. Gallup and Wells Fargo conduct a quarterly survey on investor sentiment by interviewing over 1000 individuals with stock market exposure. They distill the responses into an index of overall market optimism. It reached its apex in January 2000 – 2 months before the dotcom bust. The sentiment index reached its nadir in February 2009 – one month before what has become the 3rd longest bull market in American history. So much for investor convictions. It has been my experience that investors overestimate their own ability to maintain rationality in the face of market turbulence. The aggregated date supports this view. According to a Wells Fargo/Gallup survey conducted in early February, 76% said they were either very or somewhat likely to take no action during market volatility. Yet investors exited the equity markets en masse in late 2008. The second problem with investment outcomes are the products themselves. The mutual funds that investors choose to implement their beleaguered strategies also fall short of the mark. Fund companies spend fortunes to convince the public that their portfolio managers can beat the market through astute security selection or tactical asset allocation. These superstars get paid well. Data compiled by Morningstar indicates that the cost structure of mutual funds has remained high in the new century. The average US equity mutual fund still charges 1.25% annually. Given the secular decline in bond yields, this resilience of high fees is especially surprising in the fixed income space. Fees in the average bond fund now exceed 25% of the yield to maturity of the ten year Treasury bond – up from 13% a decade ago. Have the expert fund managers delivered? The aggregate data tells us no. In fact, actively managed mutual funds lag the performance of a corresponding index by an amount that is not significantly different than the expenses they charge. A reasonable response to this result might be that mutual funds cannot beat the average because they are ultimately competing against themselves. It’s up to individual investors or their investment consultants to identify the “best of breed” managers in each asset class. A foundational approach in this effort is the evaluation of past performance. Again the data throws cold water on this theory. Past performance demonstrates virtually no persistence across a wide range of equity mutual fund asset classes. Top quartile performers depart the top quartile at the rate faster than predicted by random chance. If returns were completely random from year to year, there would be a 25% likelihood that a dart throwing manager could return to the top quartile. Doesn’t work that way as selected data from S&P Dow Jones indicate in the table below. Is There a Better Way? There is a corollary to the rather pessimistic findings of the previous section. If moving assets around is a destructive behavior, then keeping them in place is a better option. Long term performance of the major classes has been sufficient over the last ten or even hundred years to deliver comfortable retirement outcomes to most serious investors. Sure, it’s no guarantee that the public financial markets will continue to serve as stores of value. But stocks and bonds are about the best option the investing public has. A qualified investment advisor can play a constructive role here. Besides the technical ability to craft and implement an investment plan, a key advantage is the discipline that investors gain to stick to the plan amidst the financial noise that is sure to follow. Vanguard estimates that behavioral coaching is worth about 1.5% to investors each year. Based on a Vanguard study of actual client behavior, we found that investors who deviated from their initial retirement fund investment trailed the target-date fund benchmark by 1.5%. This suggests that the discipline and guidance that an advisor might provide through behavioral coaching could be the largest potential value-add of the tools available to advisors. Although the financial markets have suffered few reverses over the past six years, rest assured that market panics will follow at some point. Consider the wisdom of Meir Statman, Professor of Finance at Santa Clara, who wrote the following in the Wall Street Journal near the nadir of the recent financial crisis when investor sentiment was stacked against the stock market. Don’t chase last year’s investment winners. Your ability to predict next year’s investment winner is no better than your ability to predict next week’s lottery winner. A diversified portfolio of many investments might make you a loser during a year or even a decade, but a concentrated portfolio of few investments might ruin you forever. Consistency will get you there. Have the courage NOT to act on your own beliefs. It will be worth it. 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Market Lab Report – Premarket Pulse 9/25/15

Major averages fell yesterday on higher volume though closed in the top quarter of their respective trading ranges. Federal Reserve chairperson Yellen gave a speech after yesterday’s close. “Prospects for the U.S. economy generally appear solid” and signs of weak growth overseas won’t prove large enough to have a significant impact on policy, noted Yellen. Futures are consequently higher by more than 1% at the time of this writing as her words soothed worries that the US economy could get pulled down with the problematic global economy. That said, when major world economies tumble, it always has affected other major economies. The US is no exception. So while China’s troubles could spill over into the US, major market tops can take months to form. Thus in answer to the question of whether one should short at the close given problems in China because they believe markets are heading lower, the market remains in a highly volatile gap-up, gap-down state with various forms of manipulation still present. Thus one takes ample risk of putting on a new position at the close in the hopes of a gap down the next day. The odds are better in buying or shorting the right stocks at the right time as a number of such stocks have been nicely profitable this year, rather than trying to get “cute” with the market by trying to predict gap downs at the next day’s open, as this is often news driven. This morning’s sharp gap-up coming immediately on the heels of yesterday’s sharp gap-down provides a case in point.