Author Archives: Scalper1

I Was Wrong About Shorting Volatility

I posited at the beginning of this correction that shorting volatility looked very enticing at current levels. That has turned out to be a terrible call as my belief that there would be a quick rebound in the equity markets was disproved. I’ll provide my outlook for the markets and shorting volatility going forward from here. Ever since the current market rout started, I’ve been salivating at the chance to get short volatility via the short term volatility ETF VXX (NYSEARCA: VXX ). This is a strategy I’ve used repeatedly over the past year or so to take advantage of buying the dip on a leveraged basis and it has worked very well. Unfortunately for me (and many others) this dip turned into a correction. My last post on the subject seems like ages ago at this point but if you’d like to see my rationale at the time, please take a look. Some time has passed and the landscape for shorting volatility has become a lot more complicated so in this article, I’ll update my views on shorting volatility and see what I think is next for markets and VXX. (click to enlarge) Obviously, I was too early. That comes from my steadfast belief in “buy the dip” that has developed over the past six years of this bull market. It has worked beautifully in the past but of course, this time it did not. This is why it is important to keep volatility-related positions small and why I always issue that warning in VXX pieces. I’ll issue it again here and offer that any position in VXX is, by its nature, speculative. Please keep positions small and understand that the potential for large rewards comes with the potential for sizable risks as well; the chart above shows this better than my words can convey. Now that we’ve established my original premise for shorting volatility this time around has proven to be unequivocally incorrect, let’s take a look at what may happen in the short to intermediate time frames with respect to the market and the VXX. The fact that the VIX is still elevated above 23 this many weeks into the correction is something I never thought would happen as it was beginning back in late August. I saw the spike down as just that and nothing more but obviously, we have something larger on our hands here. (click to enlarge) The VIX is showing tremendous ability to remain elevated and given the term structure at present, it appears traders think it will continue or even go higher. Credit: VIX Central We can see the spot VIX is near 24 while the front month is just over 22. But if we look further out, there is only a small drop in what the market is predicting volatility will look like several months into the future. While this isn’t unusual during a correction, there is real money on the line here so there are some traders with serious firepower betting on a sustainably higher VIX. The second mistake I made is in assuming contango would disappear quickly, as it had during so many quick down turns in the market in the last several years. As you can see, I made a pretty high probability bet that the spike in contango would be short-lived. Obviously, that is not the case. While contango has lessened significantly, it is still present. And as the down turn in 2011 showed us, it can stay that way for a long time. Given the way the VIX is behaving so many weeks into the spike, I have to think we are in for some more suffering before things get materially better. Now, these two conditions were the very reasons I originally put my short VXX trade so I’m not going against my system that has worked time and again; what I’m saying is that this time is different and requires a different approach. I found out this time was different the hard way – by losing money – but that doesn’t mean we can’t adapt and learn. First, I think the equity markets are in for some more selling before repairs can be made to the damage that we’ve seen in the past six weeks or so. We can see here that when the market (NYSEARCA: SPY ) broke down, it broke down hard and hasn’t looked back. (click to enlarge) The spike bottom has yet to be retested and the SPY formed a rising wedge pattern in the midst of a down trend, usually a bearish formation. We can see the formation was broken in the last week or so and stocks have moved down ever since. I think this wedge pattern coming to completion and the fact that there are no catalysts to buy mean a retest of ~187 on SPY is very likely and perhaps, even a move lower than that. The bottom line is my short to intermediate term outlook on the SPY is negative until we get a retest of the spike lows and until that happens VXX’s bias is up, not down. While the basic conditions of my short VXX trade are still in place (contango, elevated VIX) the one other major condition (a healthy stock market) has disappeared. That means VXX, VIX, and contango could stay elevated for extended periods of time and that means the short volatility trade is probably going to tread water or see another move lower in the coming weeks. I moved out of my short VXX position for a sizable loss because conditions changed and my reasoning for the trade in the first place evaporated. While taking losses is very painful, it is the right thing to do when you are proven wrong by the market. I will short VXX again at some point but I need to see a few things first. I need to see the SPY retest its lows successfully. That will mean a move down from current levels and some painful selling to set up a base that currently does not exist. Until that happens, shorting VXX is very dangerous. Second, I need to see the VIX sustain selling pressure. Until the market retests its lows the VIX is likely to stay elevated. That means shorting volatility in general isn’t going to work. Lastly, I think time is the final condition. This correction has taken a psychological toll on investors and that takes time to heal. Extremely volatile action like we’ve seen causes people to bail and until calm is restored, sustained buying pressure – and lower volatility – are going to be hard to come by. The time will come to short VXX again will come but for now, I’m out of this trade. I was proven wrong by the market so I’m licking my wounds until a better opportunity presents itself.

How To Avoid Potential Value Traps With Net-Nets And Other Deep Value Stocks

Summary Rejecting ideas fast is a key aspect of making one’s stock research and investment process more efficient and effective. I provide several categories of companies and specific stocks that I rejected as potential value traps, as I ran through my raw stock screens. My exclusive research service, Asia/U.S. Deep-Value Wide-Moat Stocks, flags potential value traps with corporate governance issues, financial statement manipulation risks and other red flags. Background On The Idea Of Rejecting Potential Value Traps I have been a keen follower of Nate Tobik’s (Oddball Stocks) writings and work on deep value investing. In October 2014, Nate participated in a value investing seminar, where the video of his presentation was posted online here. In Nate’s presentation, he spoke about the process of finding and investing in oddball stocks. What caught my attention was this first bullet point on his slide titled ‘Evaluating Ideas’ where Nate wrote “Fail fast: Want to reject ideas as quickly as possible.” In the sections below, I outline certain (non-exhaustive) categories of companies and specific stocks that I rejected as potential value traps, as I ran through my raw stock screens. Past Dealings With Minority Shareholders Wong’s Kong King International (532 HK) operates under two segments: Trading and Manufacturing. The Trading segment is engaged in the trading and distribution of chemicals, materials and equipment used in the manufacturing of printed circuit boards and electronic products; while its Manufacturing business is involved in the manufacturing of electrical and electronic products. Wong’s Kong King is a net-net trading at 0.60 times P/NCAV. Based on its share price of HK$0.65 as of September 25, 2015, Wong’s Kong King’s share price is approaching its 5-year low, while its P/B ratio of 0.34 is close to the 10-year low of 0.32. In August 2006, Wong’s Kong King announced that Chairman Mr Senta Wong proposed to privatize the Company via a Scheme of Arrangement at HK$1.38 per share. The proposed privatization did not go through because it was not approved by the majority of independent shareholders (excluding controlling shareholders/interested parties) in October 2006. In April 2007, the Company announced that it will dispose of substantially all the operating businesses and assets of the Company to Mr Senta Wong and distribute the sales proceeds of approximately HK$1.17 billion or HK$1.65 per share to shareholders (“Proposal”); the Company will become an empty shell and subsequently be delisted. At the Special General Meeting in June 2007, the resolution relating to the Proposal was not passed by independent shareholders. Only 47.22% of the votes were cast in favor of the Proposal, falling short of the 75% required. Mr David Webb, a well-known activist investor, owned more than 3.16% of Wong’s Kong King’s shares at that point the Proposal was announced, and highlighted that he “would veto it at the shareholders’ meeting on June 28.” According to a South China Morning Post article dated June 7, 2007, Mr David Webb said that “We estimate that fair value of this stock to be around eight times trailing earnings, or over HK$3 per share. We would reject an offer below HK$2.50.” According to the circular issued by the independent financial advisors, comparable companies trade at mean and median P/Es of 9.64 and 8.84 respectively, compared with a 4.68 times implied P/E based on the HK$1.65 per share disposal value. While Wong’s Kong King is enticing as a deep value net-net stock at current valuations, the Company’s past actions indicate that it is less likely that an attractive or reasonable privatization offer will be on the cards anytime soon. Sub-Optimal Capital Allocation Miko International Holdings (1247 HK) is “a mid-to-high end children’s apparel brand in China. Its “redkids” brand is ranked second among mid-to-high end children’s apparel brands in China,” according to its company profile . Miko is a net-net valued by the market at 0.54 times P/NCAV. Net cash also accounted for approximately 124% of Miko’s market capitalization, implying the investors are getting the Company’s core business operations for free at current valuations. In June 2015, the Company announced it was issuing 85 million new placement shares (10.3% of the issued share capital) at HK$1.03 per share, or 10% discount to its closing share price of HK$1.15 on June 24, 2015. In the end, the placement was terminated in July 2015, due to “continued high volatility in Hong Kong and PRC securities market and unstable political and economic conditions in Europe.” Nevertheless, the proposed placement did not make sense considering the significant amount of net cash (HK$528 million of net cash on its books as at end-June 2015 versus HK$87.6 million to be raised) it has on its balance sheet and the stock’s low valuations (even at that point in time). Good companies engage in value-accretive capital allocation practices by placing out new shares when their stock is overvalued, and repurchasing shares when their stock is undervalued; companies which are potential value traps do the reverse. Target Of Short-Sellers China Zhongwang (OTC: CHZHY ) (1333 HK) is the world’s second largest and Asia’s largest producer and developer of industrial aluminum extrusion products.” China Zhongwang is a deep value stock trading at half of its book value, which is close to its historical P/B low of 0.46. Dupre Analytics (DA), a short-seller research firm, issued a report on China Zhongwang and disclosed its short position in the Company in end-July 2015. DA claimed that the Company’s “real revenues are much lower than reported,” and “overstated CAPEX expenses” among other allegations. China Zhongwang has since made clarifications in announcements here and here , rebutting DA’s claims. In the announcements, the Company’s Board “reiterates that the allegations in the DA Report are groundless, and that the DA Report contains various misrepresentations, malicious and false allegations and obvious factual errors.” I follow a couple of short-seller research firms and their work; I tend to avoid stocks highlighted by them as I prefer not to bet against the “smart money.” I also use the Beneish M-Score as a tool to filter for potential value traps. Takeaways I always liked the quote “Losing an illusion makes you wiser than finding a truth,” and I found that this applies equally to value investing. The earlier that one loses the illusion that all deep value stocks are unjustifiably cheap, and rejects certain potential investment candidates and adds them to his or her list of value traps to be avoided, the closer he or she will get closer to finding and picking the truly undervalued stocks. (Note: I am not a English major; I might have misinterpretated the quote and applied it incorrectly.) Note: I flag potential value traps with corporate governance issues, financial statement manipulation risks and other red flags as part of my Asia/U.S. Deep-Value Wide-Moat Stocks exclusive research service. My subscribers get access to the list of value traps for both deep value & wide moat stocks, in addition to monthly top ideas, potential investment candidate profiles and potential investment candidate watchlists.

Lower Risk Versions Of A Dual Momentum Fixed Income Strategy

Summary This article presents the performance and risk of Lower Risk Versions (LRVs) of a dual momentum fixed income strategy as compared to a High Risk Version (HRV) presented previously. The difference between the LRVs and HRV is the number of assets per month; the HRV selects one asset per month, while the LRVs select multiple assets per month. The LRV-3 (3 assets per month), backtested to 1994 using mutual fund proxies, has a CAGR of 10.2%, a standard deviation of 6.3%, and a maximum drawdown of -6.1%. The minimum annual return of LRV-3 is -2.4% in 1994. All other annual returns are positive. The LRVs are more robust than the HRV, and should be used by more conservative investors, who desire reasonable growth with less volatility and drawdown. In a recent article on Seeking Alpha, I discussed a simple tactical bond ETF strategy employing relative strength momentum. This strategy is explained in detail here . I will call the original strategy the High Risk Version (HRV) of the fixed income strategy, since only one ETF is selected each month (out of a basket of five ETFs). This article presents Lower Risk Versions (LRVs) of the same momentum strategy. For LRVs, a multiple number of ETFs are selected each month in order to reduce volatility and drawdown compared to the HRV, while still maintaining a CAGR greater than an equalweight portfolio holding all five assets. My basic objectives of the LRVs are: 1. A CAGR > 10%; 2. A standard deviation (SD) that is less than the SD of an equalweight portfolio of all assets; 3. No negative years of return; and 4. A maximum drawdown based on monthly returns of less than 7%. I started out by making a slight modification to the original HRV strategy in order to turn the strategy into a dual momentum strategy. The original methodology only used relative strength (no absolute momentum) to determine what asset to select. But, in a way, the original HRV that selected only one asset each month was really a dual momentum strategy, because a short-term treasury was included in the basket of assets. In order to determine the effect of selecting multiple assets each month rather than just one asset, I needed to use a true dual momentum approach instead of a relative strength strategy. So I have switched to the dual momentum technique in this study. Dual momentum strategies have been popularized by Gary Antonacci and are well-known to many investors. Dual momentum means relative strength momentum is first used to select the top-ranked asset(s) each month, and then the top-ranked asset(s) have to pass an additional absolute momentum test (must have positive momentum) in order to be selected in any given month. I selected a basket of five fixed income assets that have relatively low correlation to each other. A major challenge in developing fixed income strategies is the short history of fixed income ETFs. This results in rather limited backtesting for the ETFs. To extend the backtesting, mutual fund proxies are used that have longer histories; this permits backtesting of the strategy to the 1990s. Shown below are the assets in the basket, both the ETF and the mutual fund proxy. Convertible Bonds: SPDR Barclays Capital Convertible Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: CWB ) – Vanguard Convertible Securities Fund (MUTF: VCVSX ) High Yield Bonds: SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: JNK ) – Fidelity Advisor High Income Advantage Fund (MUTF: FAHDX ) Long Term Treasury: iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: TLT ) – Vanguard Long Term Treasury Fund (MUTF: VUSTX ) Short Term Treasury: iShares 1-3 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: SHY ) – Vanguard Short Term Treasury Fund (MUTF: VFISX ) Emerging Market Bonds: PowerShares Emerging Markets Sovereign Debt Portfolio ETF (NYSEARCA: PCY ) – Fidelity New Markets Income Fund (MUTF: FNMIX ) In the original article, I used CNSAX as proxy for CWB and PREMX as proxy for PCY. But based on comments by EquityCurve in the original article, in order to get backtesting to 1994 instead of 1998, I changed to VCVSX instead of CNSAX and FNMIX instead of PREMX. So backtesting of the mutual funds now goes back to 1994. 1994 turns out to be a difficult year for bonds and I’m glad I could include it in the analysis. (All of this work was performed using the free Portfolio Visualizer software. Any investor can go online and trade the strategies in this article without any cost.) It turns out that the dual momentum strategy using this basket of assets is very robust, and good results are seen if one, two, three, four or all five ETFs are selected each month. There is the usual tradeoff between growth and drawdown depending on the number of assets selected each month. The greater the number of assets selected, the less the risk and growth. I will now present the results of the HRV that selects only one asset each month. These results are similar to the results presented in the original article, and are presented here just to be consistent with the results of the LRVs shown later in this article. The basket of mutual funds is used, and the backtesting timeframe is 1994-present. Two relative strength timing periods are employed to rank the funds: 4-months and 2-months. A 51% weighting on the 4-month ranking and a 49% weighting on the 2-month ranking is used. The 51%/49% weighting split is a good way to ensure that the 4-month timing period determines the better-ranking asset if there is a tie. The total return curves of the HRV, the equalweight portfolio (buy and hold all five assets, rebalanced annually), and the S&P 500 are shown below, together with a table of their relevant parameters and annual returns. Total Return Curve of HRV: (click to enlarge) Tabular Summary of HRV Results: (click to enlarge) Annual Returns: (click to enlarge) It can be seen that the HRV has a CAGR of 15.0%, an SD of 10.4%, and a maximum drawdown (based on monthly returns) of -13.0%. In terms of a risk-adjusted return on investment, the CAGR/SD is 1.44. This compares with holding an equalweight portfolio that has a CAGR of 7.8%, an SD of 7.0%, a maximum drawdown of -17.6%, and a CAGR/SD of 1.11. It can be seen that the HRV substantially increases growth at the expense of volatility (standard deviation). Yet the maximum drawdown is actually better for the HRV than the equalweight portfolio holding all five assets. For the LRVs, I systematically looked at various combinations of timing periods and number of assets selected each month. Overall, when two or more assets are selected each month, the strategy tends to be very robust in terms of what timing periods are used for relative strength ranking. This means the strategy works well for various sets of timing periods and results do not change dramatically when timing periods are varied slightly. With some flexibility in what timing periods to choose, I decided to use the same timing periods that I employed for the HRV in my previous article, namely 4-months and 2-months. I first show graphical results when one, two, three, four and five assets are selected each month. A logarithmic scale of total return is employed. One asset (HRV): (click to enlarge) Two assets (LRV-2): (click to enlarge) Three assets (LRV-3): (click to enlarge) Four assets (LRV-4): (click to enlarge) Five assets (LRV-5): (click to enlarge) The results of LRV-5, compared to the equalweight portfolio, identify the effect of absolute momentum. It can be seen that absolute momentum mainly plays a role in reducing drawdown, and does not significantly affect growth in the years when drawdown does not occur. The beneficial effect of absolute momentum continues to be seen as the number of assets is reduced using relative strength. When the number of assets is reduced using relative strength, higher portfolio growth is seen as expected. The highest growth, of course, comes when only one asset is selected each month corresponding to the HRV. The tabular form of the overall results is shown below: (click to enlarge) The tradeoff between performance and risk is seen in the table above. Based on the objectives stated previously, the best LRV is LRV-3 (three assets each month). LRV-3 has a CAGR of 10.2%, an SD of 6.3%, a maximum drawdown of 6.1%, and CAGR/SD of 1.62. This compares well against the equalweight portfolio that has a CAGR of 7.8%, an SD of 7.0%, a maximum drawdown of -17.6%, and a CAGR/SD of 1.11. Thus, the LRV-3 has significantly higher CAGR, lower SD, and substantially lower drawdown and higher risk-adjusted return on investment than the equalweight portfolio. The equalweight portfolio also has three negative years: 1994 (-6.4%), 1998 (-0.3%), and 2008 (-11.6%), while the LRV-3 only has one year with negative returns: 1994 (-2.4%). In comparison to the HRV, the LRV-3 has lower growth (CAGR of 10.2% versus 15.0%), but the SD (6.3% versus 10.4%) and maximum drawdown (-6.1% versus -14.5%) are greatly improved. And the risk-adjusted return on investment of LRV-3 is significantly better (CAGR/SD of 1.62 versus 1.44). And for 1994, the LRV-3 has a -2.4% return, while the HRV has a -5.4% return. One negative aspect of the LRV-3 is that more trades are required each year compared to the HRV. However, the costs will still be minimal for an account value over $100K. Based on backtest results, the average number of annual trades (buys and sells) is approximately 20 for LRV-3. In a Schwab account, this amounts to a cost of 20 x $9 = $180 per year. So, the cost is about 0.18% for a $100K account. In addition, PCY and CWB are commission-free ETFs on Schwab (and the commission-free SCHO is a good substitute for VFISX). So, the commission costs of trading LRV-3 (neglecting any other costs) are quite minimal. A final step in this study is to ensure the ETF version of the strategy gives similar results as the mutual fund version. The ETF version can only be backtested to 2010, so the 2010-present timeframe is used for comparison. The backtest results for the ETFs and the mutual funds for LRV-3 are shown below. LRV-3 Results Using ETFs (2010 – Present) (click to enlarge) LRV-3 Results Using Mutual Funds (2010 – Present) (click to enlarge) Good agreement is seen between using ETFs and mutual funds. Using ETFs, the CAGR is 7.9%, the SD is 6.2%, and the maximum drawdown is -4.5%. Using mutual funds, the CAGR is 8.3%, the SD is 5.3%, and the maximum drawdown is -4.2%. It should be noted that the performance of the mutual funds from 2010-present is less than the performance between 1994-present. This is probably caused by the Federal Reserve holding short-term rates near zero from 2009-present. When short-term rates are increased, performance should eventually increase (after, perhaps, a short time of reduced performance). Also to be noted is that LRV-3 has gone to all cash (money market) since July 2015. So, for July, August and September, the top three assets based on relative strength have not passed the absolute momentum test. In summary, the LRV-3 should be used by more conservative investors, who desire solid growth (10%) with lower risk, while HRV should be used if more growth is desired (15%) at the expense of higher risk. For those investors, who desire even lower risk than LRV-3 as well as higher risk-adjusted return on investment, LRV-5 might be a better choice. For 1994-present, LRV-5 has a CAGR of 9.0%, a maximum drawdown of only -4.4%, and a CAGR/SD of 1.80. It should be mentioned that this strategy using fixed income ETFs is best employed in non taxable retirement accounts that avoid tax issues. I would also like to thank Terry Doherty for reading over this article and making a number of excellent suggestions.