Author Archives: Scalper1

8 Questions That Should Be Keeping Buy-And-Holders Up At Night

By Rob Bennett Set forth below are eight questions that should be keeping Buy-and-Holders up at night. 1) What are the top ten changes that have been made in the Buy-and-Hold strategy as a result of Shiller’s “revolutionary” findings? Yale Economics Professor Robert Shiller showed in peer-reviewed research published in 1981 that valuations affect long-term returns. That “revolutionary” (Shiller’s word) finding changed everything we thought we knew about how stock investing works. If valuations affect long-term returns, stock risk is variable rather than fixed; that means that we can reduce risk by taking valuations into account when setting our stock allocations. Shiller’s book exploring this finding in depth was a national bestseller. He was awarded a Nobel prize for his work. Given the importance of this advance in our understanding of how stock investing works, one would have expected that the Buy-and-Holders would have made scores of changes to their strategy to reflect the new understanding. Can the Buy-and-Holders identify even ten changes? Can they identify even one? 2) Why was there no reaction from the lead promoters of Buy-and-Hold when Brett Arends of the Wall Street Journal wrote that they are “leaving out half the story” of how stock investing works? I have been writing about the dangers of Buy-and-Hold for 13 years now. So I was encouraged when I saw the Arends article saying that to ignore the effect of valuations on long-term returns is to leave out half the story of how stock investing works. I was amazed to see the article go down the memory hole without generating comment (except by me). Arends could be wrong. But, if he were, it would be in the interests of the Buy-and-Hold advocates to point out his mistake. Why did no one do this? 3) Why has there been no clear explanation of the errors that were made in the Old School safe-withdrawal-rate studies? I pointed out the error in the famous “4 percent rule” in May 2002. I got a lot of flak from Buy-and-Holders for doing so. But 13 years later just about every major publication in the field has run an article noting that the 4 percent rule is not backed by the historical data and that it would be dangerous for retirees to continue to follow it. How was this mistake made? Why did it take so long to discover it? What can we learn from the mistake? 4) How was Shiller able to predict an economic crisis that began in September 2008 in a book published in March 2000? I am the only person in this field who has blamed the economic crisis on the heavy promotion of Buy-and-Hold strategies (the idea that investors don’t need to lower their stock allocations when prices reach insanely dangerous levels caused the out-of-control bull market of the late 1990s and the loss of the $12 trillion of pretend wealth created by the bull market caused consumer buying power to constrict enough to cause hundreds of thousands of businesses to fail). Except for Shiller. Shiller has not said in the wake of the 2008 crash that Buy-and-Hold caused the economic crisis. But he did predict the loss of trillions in pretend wealth in Irrational Exuberance , a loss that he suggested would likely take place late in the first decade of the new century. How did he know? And why have others not drawn the obvious conclusion that, since Shiller’s investing model was the one that predicted the crash and the economic crisis, it has earned credibility in the eyes of fair-minded people? 5) How did Bogle come up with his rule that investors never need to lower their stock allocations by more than 15 percentage points no matter how high stock prices go? A regression analysis shows that the most likely 10-year annualized return for an index-fund purchase made in 1981 was 15 percent real. In 2000, it was a negative 1 percent real. An 80 percent stock allocation makes sense in the former circumstance. A 20 percent stock allocation makes sense in the latter circumstance. That’s a change of 60 percentage points, not 15. Bogle’s number is off by 400 percent. 6) Why do Buy-and-Holders become so emotional when their claims are challenged? I have been banned at over 20 investing discussion boards and blogs. It is a common experience for me to receive apologies from the site owners who ban me in which they note that they believe that my work has great value and that they consider me one of the most polite and warm posters on the internet. They say that they are banning me solely because their Buy-and-Hold readers demand it and because they don’t want to lose the business brought by these followers of a purportedly research-based strategy. Huh? Why would followers of a research-based strategy be upset by challenges to their beliefs? Wouldn’t they see such challenges as a way to confirm and thereby strengthen their convictions? 7) Why was Wade Pfau not able to find a single peer-reviewed study showing that long-term timing doesn’t work or isn’t required? I worked with Academic Researcher Wade Pfau for 16 months. Wade holds a Ph.D. from Princeton. He performed an in-depth search of the academic literature trying to identify a single study showing either that long-term timing (changing one’s stock allocation in response to big valuation shifts with the understanding that it might not produce benefits for ten years or longer) doesn’t work or isn’t required without success. Could it be that, contrary to the core belief of the Buy-and-Holders, one form of market timing always works and is always 100 percent required for investors seeking to keep their risk profiles roughly constant? 8) Is there any reason to believe that price matters any less in the stock market than it does in every other market known to humankind? Price is what makes the car market run. Price is what makes the banana market run. Price is what makes the sweater market run. Price is what makes the grass-seed market run. How can we be so sure that price does not matter when buying stocks? If large numbers of the participants in these other markets became convinced that it was not necessary to take price into consideration when making purchases, it would cause them to collapse. Could that be why we have been seeing so much turmoil in the stock market in recent years? Disclosure: None

Market Lab Report – Premarket Pulse 10/20/15

Major averages rose yesterday on lower volume with the NASDAQ Composite a kiss away from its 200-day moving average. Expect a continuation of the tug-o-war between signs of economic strength which determine the future of quantitative easing (QE) and rate hikes: Key variables that can push the market higher: 1) QE 2) Global economic strength – if it is believed this is a sign of a sustainable recovery, the onset of higher rates will be considered a bullish event 3) U.S. economic strength – if it is believed this is a sign of a sustainable recovery, the onset of higher rates will be considered a bullish event Key variables that can push the market lower: 1) Global economic strength – if it is believed this is not sustainable, the onset of higher rates will be considered a bearish event 2) US economic strength – if it is believed this is not sustainable, the onset of higher rates will be considered a bearish event We have been at inflection points on a number of variables this year which accounts for much of the market’s trendless, sideways action. The global economic slowdown, especially in China, created the first correction exceeding -10% that the U.S. market has seen on the S&P 500, since 2011. But such economic slowdowns have central banks fueling markets with additional QE, further kicking the can down the road, and the road is a long one having started in late 2008. But this year’s trendless market action in the U.S. and downtrends in global markets shows QE has a limited lifespan. As always, keep a close eye on your stocks and watch lists. Despite this year’s trendlessness, profit opportunities in stocks have been present as can be seen in this year’s Pocket Pivot and Buyable Gap-Up reports. Of course, a deft hand of taking profits when you have them in context with the stock’s chart relative to itself and to the general market have also been key. Telecom infrastructure company Dycom (DY) had a pocket pivot. Earnings are skyrocketing, sales are accelerating, group rank 7. Supply chain management software company Manhattan Associates (MANH) had a pocket pivot at near breakout point. Pretax margin 28%, ROE 48.5%, consistent and robust earnings and sales, group rank 23.

Building A Bulletproof Portfolio Of Lower Beta Stocks

Summary An investor can “bulletproof” his portfolio while maximizing his expected return using the hedged portfolio method. When creating a hedged portfolio, you can start from scratch or start by narrowing down your universe of stocks. We explore the second method here. The stock we start with are ones with lower betas. Although CAPM predicts lower beta stocks will have lower returns, evidence suggests the opposite is the case. Since lower beta stocks are not without risk, owning them within a hedged portfolio can make sense. We recap the hedged portfolio method, show how you can build a hedged portfolio of lower beta stocks yourself, and provide a sample portfolio. Seeking Beta The traditional view of lower beta stocks, encapsulated in the Capital Asset Pricing Model ( CAPM ), is that they offer lower risk than higher beta stocks, but also lower returns. Seeking Alpha contributor and hedge fund manager Dr. Eric Falkenstein is one of the researchers who has challenged that, presenting evidence that lower beta stocks actually generate higher returns than higher beta stocks. In a 2012 Seeking Alpha article (“Is Low Vol A Beta Phenomenon”), Falkestein included the chart below, showing that, among the top 1500 stocks by market cap (excluding financials), stocks with lower beta (average beta of 0.85 versus 1 for the market) had outperformed both the market and high beta stocks since 1990. The Risks of Investing in Lower Beta Stocks As with any style of stock investing, when investing in lower beta stocks, you face two kinds of risks: idiosyncratic risk , the risk of something bad happening to one of the companies you own, and market risk , the risk of your investments suffering due to a decline of the market as a whole. By definition, the market risk of lower beta stocks should be less than that of the market (assuming the lower beta stocks you buy remain lower beta, which isn’t always the case, as Seeking Alpha contributor Matti Suominen has noted ), but the idiosyncratic, or stock-specific risk of lower beta stocks may come as a surprise to some investors. Six months ago, for example, how many investors in Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT ) (beta: 0.82) would have thought they would be down nearly 25% on the stock by mid-October, as the chart below shows? (click to enlarge) Two Ways of Limiting Stock-Specific Risk One way to limit stock-specific risk is via hedging; another way is via diversification. In a previous article (“How to Limit Your Market Risk”), we discussed ways to limit market risk for a diversified portfolio. In this post, we’ll look at how to “bulletproof” a concentrated portfolio of lower beta stocks using the hedged portfolio method . In that method, you limit both stock-specific and market risk via hedging. Below, we’ll show how to use that method to construct a “bulletproof”, or hedged portfolio for an investor who is unwilling to risk a drawdown of more than 16%, and has $250,000 that he wants to invest. First, though, let’s address the issue of risk tolerance, and how it affects potential return. Risk Tolerance and Potential Return All else equal, with a hedged portfolio, the greater an investor’s risk tolerance — the greater the maximum drawdown he is willing to risk (his “threshold”, in our terminology) – the higher his potential return will be. So, we should expect that an investor who is willing to risk a 26% decline will have a chance at higher potential returns than one who is only willing to risk a 6% drawdown. In our example, we’ll be splitting the difference and using a 16% threshold. Constructing A Hedged Portfolio We’ll outline the process here briefly, and then explain how you can implement it yourself. Finally, we’ll present an example of a hedged portfolio that was constructed this way with an automated tool. The process, in broad strokes, is this: Find securities with promising potential returns (we define potential return as a high-end, bullish estimate of how the security will perform). Find securities that are relatively inexpensive to hedge. Buy a handful of securities that score well on the first two criteria; in other words, buy a handful of securities with high potential returns net of their hedging costs (or, ones with high net potential returns). Hedge them. The potential benefits of this approach are twofold: If you are successful at the first step (finding securities with high potential returns), and you hold a concentrated portfolio of them, your portfolios should generate decent returns over time. If you are hedged, and your return estimates are completely wrong, on occasion — or the market moves against you — your downside will be strictly limited. How to Implement This Approach Finding promising lower beta stocks Most brokerage websites offer screeners that let you screen for lower beta stocks. Since you’re going to hedge your stocks, you’ll want to limit your screen to stocks that are optionable. Next, you’ll need to calculate potential returns for your lower-beta, optionable stocks. One way to do that is to look up the consensus price targets for each stock, and derive potential returns in percentage terms from them. We offered an example of doing that for Novo Nordisk (NYSE: NVO ) in a recent article (“Building A Hedged Portfolio Around A Position In Novo Nordisk”). In general, though, you’ll need to use the same time frame for each of your potential return calculations to facilitate comparisons of potential returns, hedging costs, and net potential returns. Our method starts with calculations of six-month potential returns. Finding inexpensive ways to hedge these securities Whatever hedging method you use, for this example, you’d want to make sure that each security is hedged against a greater-than-16% decline over the time frame covered by your potential return calculations (our method attempts to find optimal static hedges using collars as well as protective puts going out approximately six months). And you’ll need to calculate your cost of hedging as a percentage of position value. Select the securities with highest net potential returns When starting from a large universe of securities, you’d want to select the ones with the highest potential returns, net of hedging costs, but, in any case, you’ll at least want to exclude any of them that has a negative potential return net of hedging costs. It doesn’t make sense to pay X to hedge a stock if you estimate the stock will return 7% declines, they all had positive net potential returns when hedged against > 16% declines. Nevertheless, the site rejected GOOGL. Why? Because of its share price ($695.32) relative to the size of the portfolio ($250k). For a portfolio of this size, the site attempts to allocate equal dollar amounts to 4 primary securities. Since a quarter of the portfolio would be $62,500, and a round lot of GOOGL would have cost more than that ($69,532), the site eliminated GOOGL from consideration for this portfolio. As it allocated cash to each of the stocks we entered, it rounded down the dollar amounts to get round lots of each stock. In its fine-tuning step, Portfolio Armor added Tesla Motors (NASDAQ: TSLA ) as a cash substitute, to replace most of the cash leftover from the rounding down process. TSLA happens to be a higher beta stock, but the site doesn’t take beta into account when adding cash substitutes; instead, it looks at which securities (whether stocks or exchange traded products) have the highest net potential returns when hedged as a cash substitute. Let’s turn our attention now to the portfolio level summary. Worst-Case Scenario The “Max Drawdown” column in the portfolio level summary shows the worst-case scenario for this hedged portfolio. If every underlying security in it went to zero before their hedges expired, the portfolio would decline 14.33%. Negative Hedging Cost Note that, in this case, the total hedging cost for the portfolio was negative, -0.19%, meaning the investor would receive more income in total from selling the call legs of the collars on his positions than he spent buying the puts. Best-Case Scenario At the portfolio level, the net potential return is 13.77% over the next six months. This represents the best-case scenario, if each underlying security in the portfolio meets its potential return (since three of these positions are uncapped, it’s theoretically possible that the portfolio could return more than 13.77% if each of the uncapped stocks exceeds its potential return). A More Likely Scenario The portfolio level expected return of 5.52% represents a more conservative estimate, based on the historical relationship between our calculated potential returns and actual returns. By way of comparison, the average 6 month return for the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) over the last 10 years was 3.84%. Each Security Is Hedged Note that each of the above securities is hedged. TSLA, the cash substitute, is hedged with an optimal collar with its cap set at 1%, HRL is hedged with an optimal collar, with its cap set at its potential return, and the other 3 primary securities are hedged with optimal puts, which are uncapped. In our series of 25,412 backtests conducted over an 11-year period, the average actual return of a security hedged with an optimal put was 1.93x that of one hedged with an optimal collar, so the site aims to hedge primary securities with optimal puts unless their net potential returns, when hedged with collars, are > 1.93x higher. That was the case with HRL, which is why it’s hedged with an optimal collar. That wasn’t the case for the other three primary securities, which is why they’re hedged with optimal puts. Here’s a closer look at the optimal put hedge on MO: The cap field above is blank, as this is an optimal put, which is uncapped. As you can at the bottom of the image above, the cost of the put protection on MO was $840, or 2.04% as a percentage of position value.[i] Note that, although the cost of this hedge was positive, the overall cost of hedging the portfolio was negative . Possibly More Protection Than Promised In some cases, hedges such as the ones in the portfolio above can provide more protection than promised. For an example of that, see this instablog post on hedging Tesla. [i] To be conservative, Portfolio Armor calculated the hedging cost using the ask price of the puts; in practice an investor can often buy puts for less (for some price between the bid and the ask). The other hedges in the portfolio were calculated in a similarly conservative manner, with the puts priced at the ask, and the calls priced at the bids, so the actual cost of hedging this portfolio would likely have been lower than shown (i.e., an investor would have collected more than $465, on net, after opening the hedges).